A Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability exists in the "Chat Message" window in Skype 3.0.1 and earlier versions for iPhone and iPod Touch devices.
Skype uses a locally stored HTML file to display chat messages from other Skype users, but it fails to properly encode the incoming users "Full Name", allowing an attacker to craft malicious JavaScript code that runs when the victim views the message.
To demonstrate the vulnerability, I captured a photo of a simple javascript alert() running within Skype.
Executing arbitrary Javascript code is one thing, but I found that Skype also improperly defines the URI scheme used by the built-in webkit browser for Skype. Usually you will see the scheme set to something like, "about:blank" or "skype-randomtoken", but in this case it is actually set to "file://". This gives an attacker access to the users file system, and an attacker can access any file that the application itself would be able to access.
File system access is partially mitigated by the iOS Application sandbox that Apple has implemented, preventing an attacker from accessing certain sensitive files. However, every iOS application has access to the users AddressBook, and Skype is no exception. I created a proof of concept injection and attack that shows that a users AddressBook can indeed be stolen from an iPhone or iPod touch with this vulnerability.
To further demonstrate the issue, I have recorded a video of this scenario. Please use the comments section below for your questions.
Skype uses a locally stored HTML file to display chat messages from other Skype users, but it fails to properly encode the incoming users "Full Name", allowing an attacker to craft malicious JavaScript code that runs when the victim views the message.
To demonstrate the vulnerability, I captured a photo of a simple javascript alert() running within Skype.
Executing arbitrary Javascript code is one thing, but I found that Skype also improperly defines the URI scheme used by the built-in webkit browser for Skype. Usually you will see the scheme set to something like, "about:blank" or "skype-randomtoken", but in this case it is actually set to "file://". This gives an attacker access to the users file system, and an attacker can access any file that the application itself would be able to access.
File system access is partially mitigated by the iOS Application sandbox that Apple has implemented, preventing an attacker from accessing certain sensitive files. However, every iOS application has access to the users AddressBook, and Skype is no exception. I created a proof of concept injection and attack that shows that a users AddressBook can indeed be stolen from an iPhone or iPod touch with this vulnerability.
To further demonstrate the issue, I have recorded a video of this scenario. Please use the comments section below for your questions.
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